

Evaluation of ATC Working practice from a Safety and Human Factor perspective

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Plan

- Quick Introduction
- The IJAMAN (Issage de trajectoires avec extrAction et identification de MANœuvres) toolkit
- The BISCOT (human Based rIsk and deciSiOn taking Complexity integrated tOolkiT) toolkit
- Application of IJAMAN and BISCOT to ATC evaluation
- Case Study : the ERASMUS project

Quick Introduction

DSNA

Human factors in a safety perspective




Hidden causes:

- Physical equipment
- Procedures
- Human


Means for mitigating hidden causes

Physical Equipment



Industrial Requirements


Rules & Procedures



Airspace Planning


- Separation minima
- Letters of agreement

Human



- Sectorization
- Human factors

Evolution from past to current




**Physical
Equipment**

**Rules &
Procedures**

Human

Major changes in SESAR ConOps

**Rules&
Procedures**



Human

Aircraft Trajectory

**Physical
Equipment**

Will allow for a safe implementation

provided

**Industrial
Requirements**

are defined accordingly

Safety implications in SESAR




Human
Procedures
Physical Equipment

How can we validate the
human&procedures components
of the safety argument ?


The IJAMAN and BISCOT toolkits

The IJAMAN toolkit

- Radar data
- Flight Plans
- ATC instructions




**Trajectories
of reference
+
ATC
instructions
errors**



Identification of speed maneuvers

Interpretation of maneuvers



Comparison maneuvers ↔ ATC instructions

DSNA

The BISCOT toolkit


Conflicts solved by ATC

Traffic display


ATC clearances

**Failures in ATC decision taking process
(conflict resolution?)**

**Failure in the “no decision” case
(proximate events)**



« ATC oriented » traffic display



fields associated to encounters

Application of IJAMAN and BISCOT to ATC evaluation

Applications to safety

Hazards: { 1) Initiators
2) Consequences

- Proximate events : context and possible consequences?
- ATC instruction errors : context and possible consequences?
- Abnormally long TRANSFER/ASSUME: consequences?
- Failure in conflict resolution : context and possible consequences?
- Etc...

**No “hidden independence” assumption: by getting the
“movie” representation of the traffic, possible to
distinguish the independent components:**

- 1) Geometry of the encounter (time uncertainties)
- 2) ATC workload/detection/intervention

Qualitative estimation of ATC working practice


Fields associated to conflicts:

- Min distance if no resolution: “**ATC perceived**” Gravity
- ATC intervention time in case of failed intervention : **Risk of Collision**
- Time of “Horizontal Closest Point of Approach without vertical separation” – Time of maneuver: **ATC Anticipation/Urgency/Stress**
- CWP for maneuver and at the time of the CPA (if any): **collaborative working practice**

**Underlying
Cognitive model
representation:**




Cognitive resources in dynamic




Case study : the ERASMUS project

ATC instructions in horizontal


Minimal horizontal distance (if ATCO instruction not followed)
for horizontal encounters without ERASMUS
(93 values)



ATC anticipation in horizontal



Clusters of encounters without Erasmus (119 ATC Instructions)



Clusters of encounters with Erasmus (48 ATC Instructions)

